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Growth and Inequality in Ireland: 1987-1999 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
By almost any standards Ireland’s growth experience from the mid 1980s to the 
end of the last century can be described as a roller-coaster ride.  The weak growth 
experience of the early to mid 1980s was followed by a partial recovery in the late 
1980s, followed by another trough in the early 1990s and then a period of 
unprecedented growth from about 1994.  This latter stage gave rise to the phrase 
“the Celtic Tiger” and there have been varying attempts in the literature to explain 
the origins of this growth.  For example, Honohan and Walsh (2002) suggest that 
Ireland experienced a delayed structural transformation whereby labour shifted 
out of the low-productivity agriculture sector into high-productivity industry and 
services.  This was accompanied by (and contributed to) productivity increases in  
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.  On the other hand Krugman (1997) 
maintained that Ireland’s extraordinary high growth period should be regarded as 
a regional boom.
1  In any event, general perceptions of Ireland’s economic 
performance changed dramatically over the period, perhaps best summarised by 
the contrasting (sub)titles of Dornbusch’s 1989 paper, “Ireland’s Failed 
Stabilisation” (Dornbusch, 1989) and Honohan and Walsh’s “The Irish Hare”. 
 
The contribution of this paper is to examine the evolution of inequality of income 
and expenditure over the period.  As explained below, economic theory is 
relatively agnostic as to the effect of rapid economic growth on inequality.   
Clearly, however during periods of rapid growth, should that growth be 
concentrated in certain parts of the income distribution, then there is a potential 
for significant changes in inequality.  We analyse changes in inequality by 
examining Lorenz curves for income and expenditure drawn from the Household 
Budget Surveys of 1987/88, 1994/95 and 1999/2000 (for convenience we simply 
label them 1987, 1994 and 1999 respectively).  In addition, we calculate a variety 
of summary inequality indices and also examine Lorenz curves.  We also calculate 
the Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) introduced recently by Ravallion and Chen 
                                                 
1 See Barry (2002) for an attempt to disentangle these explanations.   3
(2003) which throws light on the issue of the extent to which Ireland’s recent 
growth was “pro-poor”.  Finally, in the case of disposable income, we examine the 
composition of changes in inequality over the 1987-1999 period. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section we briefly 
review what economic theory has to say about the relationship between growth 
and inequality and we also summarise existing evidence for Ireland for the period 
under review.  In section three we discuss our data, present some summary 
statistics and also present Lorenz curves and summary inequality indices.  Section 
4 discusses whether growth was pro-poor using the GIC.  Section 5 examines the 




2.  Growth and Inequality: Theory and Existing Evidence for 
Ireland 
 
In this section we briefly review what economic theory has to say about the 
relationship between growth and inequality.  We also briefly review the existing 
evidence on developments in inequality for Ireland over the 1987-2000 period. 
 
For a long time, economic theory had relatively little to say about the impact of 
growth upon inequality.  The empirical regularity noted by Kuznets (1955) 
suggested that in the early stages of development economic growth was 
accompanied at first by rising inequality but subsequently accompanied by falling 
inequality.  Hence the famous “inverted-U” hypothesis of  Kuznets.  Subsequent 
empirical work using more reliable data has cast some doubt over the original 
Kuznets hypothesis (for example see Deiniger and Squire, 1996).  However, in a 
purely mechanistic way it is possible to see how the type of story told by Walsh 
and Honohan could lead to rising and then falling inequality.  Imagine an 
economy with say only five people, all engaged in agriculture and earning 100 
units of income, giving an income vector of [100, 100, 100, 100, 100].  Now 
suppose one of them migrates to higher-productivity industry and their income   4
rises to 200.  The income vector now changes to [100, 100, 100, 100, 200].   
Imagine that each period another person switches until eventually the income 
vector is [200, 200, 200, 200, 200].  If we calculate the Gini coefficient for each 
successive vector we will see that it rises and then falls.
2 
 
Even allowing for the relative lack of robust evidence supporting the Kuznets 
hypothesis, it is arguable that a country as rich as Ireland would be beyond the 
peak of the “inverse U” and so should have relatively low inequality.  However, 
evidence for some mature economies such as the UK and the US has suggested 
rising levels of inequality, particularly in earnings, since around the end of the 
1970s. Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Peñalosa (1999) suggest a number of reasons 
for the increase in the premium for skilled labour over unskilled labour: (a) 
increased trade, particularly with the rapidly growing East Asian economies has 
increased the relative demand for skilled labour (b) skill-biased technological 
change and (c) organisational change within firms.  They conclude that all three 
factors are key components of growth and all of them may have the effect of 
widening the income distribution but they are inclined to put the greatest weight 
upon technological change. 
 
While Aghion et al. provide explanations for rising earnings inequality they point 
out that there are no such universal trends in income inequality.  In particular, 
movements in government taxes and transfers may offset to a large degree 
developments in earnings.  We now turn to review existing evidence for Ireland. 
 
Recent Developments in Inequality in Ireland 
 
The most recent comprehensive analysis of inequality in Ireland (which covers 
broadly the same time period as this paper) is that of Nolan et al. (2000).  They 
analyse the 1994, 1997 and 1998 waves of the Living in Ireland Survey and 
present trends in inequality for what they term direct income, gross income and 
disposable income.  Direct income is income obtained from the market, in the 
                                                 
2 This simple example is adapted from Fields (1980) but it is interesting to note that it was speculation 
from a similar, but slightly more complicated example, that led Kuznets to his “inverted U” hypothesis 
(see Kuznets, 1955).   5
form of wages and salaries etc.  Gross income is direct income plus social welfare 
payments, while disposable income is gross income less income tax and social 
security contributions.  Their analysis suggests that between 1987 and 1994 
income distribution in Ireland was broadly unchanged (this applies to both gross 
and disposable income).  There was an increase in the share of income going to 
the very poorest decile, but this was offset by reductions for the third, fourth and 
fifth decile.  For the rest of the 1990s the broad trend was for a reduction in 
inequality for direct income (presumably reflecting higher employment levels), 
but a slight increase in inequality for disposable income as the offsetting effect of 
taxes and transfers was somewhat dampened.  This trend appeared to accelerate 
between 1997 and 1998.  In a subsequent article Nolan (2003) points out that 
income growth for the bottom 30% lagged substantially behind that for the very 
top incomes for the 1994-2000 period but that growth for the top 10% was not 
significantly different from that for the middle range. 
 
We now turn to our own analysis of income inequality in Ireland which replicates 
the Nolan et al analysis (but using a different dataset) and also includes inequality 
measures for expenditure.  We also present measures of the GIC of Ravallion and 
Chen. 
 
3.  Inequality Measures for Ireland, 1987-1999. 
 
Before describing the inequality measures which we calculate, we first of all 
discuss our data.  We use the Household Budget Surveys of 1987/88, 1994/95 and 
1999/2000 published by the Central Statistics Office.  This is a nationally 
representative survey carried out approximately every five years (prior to 1994 it 
was carried out every seven years) and collects a variety of information for over 
7000 households.  Households answer questions over a two-week period about 
consumption patterns, sources of income plus other information regarding 
demographic and housing circumstances etc..  The primary function of the HBS is 
the calculation of weights for use in the construction of the consumer price index, 
but the wealth of information on households has also made it a valuable source of 
data for research into other areas such as inequality and poverty (e.g. Madden,   6
2000a, 2000b). In all, 7644 households co-operated with the 1999/2000 survey, 
7877 with the 1994/95 survey and 7705 with the 1987/88 survey. 
 
We analyse inequality for two measures of household resources: disposable 
income and expenditure.  As our definition of household disposable income we 
employ the same one as used by Nolan et al i.e. direct income plus transfer 
payments less income tax and social security contributions.  Our expenditure 
measure is total expenditure excluding repayments of loans other than house 
purchase mortgages, savings and taxes.  It includes an adjustment incorporating 
the value of home grown food consumed. 
  
There are a variety of arguments for and against both income and expenditure as 
an accurate measure of household resources. Amongst the issues which must be 
considered are the following
3: certain components of income may be difficult to 
measure e.g. income from self-employment.  Furthermore, cross-section studies 
typically provide income measures which are snapshots in time and thus take no 
account of the difference between transitory and permanent income (which once 
again may be particularly pronounced for the self-employed).  Since expenditure 
decisions are usually made with reference to permanent income then expenditure 
measures may be preferable.  However, such measures also have drawbacks.   
Expenditure on items such as alcohol and tobacco are typically under-reported.  
Also, expenditure over a two-week period may not be a reliable measure of 
consumption, particularly for mature households who may have a large stock of 
durables from which they derive services. 
 
A further problem specific to the HBS is that income observations are “top-coded” 
e.g. for 1987 and 1994 values of income in excess of £800 per week are simply 
entered as £800 per week.  Thus the distribution of income is censored on the right 
hand side at a value of £800.  To avoid this problem and also to minimise the 
potential influence of measurement error (typically most severe at the top and 
bottom of the distribution) we follow the practice of Barrett et al. (2000) and trim 
the top and bottom 3 per cent of observations in both the income and expenditure 
                                                 
3 For a detailed discussion see Blundell and Preston (1998).   7
distributions.  In addition, when carrying out the decomposition analysis in section 
6 it was discovered that for some, mainly high-income, observations there was a 
discrepancy between the overall figure for disposable income and the sum of the 
components of disposable income.  These observations were dropped (30 in 1987, 
289 in 1994 and 88 in 1999). 
 
Below we present summary statistics for our definitions of weekly disposable 
income and total expenditure (standard deviations in brackets) for 1987/88, 
1994/95 and 1999/2000.  All measures are in euros at Q3 2000 prices. 
Table 1: Average Expenditure and Income, 1987-1999 
  Total exp.  Disposable Inc.  No. of Observations 





% change  11.1 8.1   





% change  38.6 41.7   






Note that total expenditure exceeds disposable income for all years, reflecting the 
understatement of income typical in surveys such as the HBS.  We also note that 
average real household expenditure increased by 11.1 per cent between 1994 /95 
and 1987/88 and by 38.6 per cent between 1994/95 and 1999/2000.  The 
corresponding figures for disposable income were 8.1 per cent and 41.7 per cent 
respectively. 
 
Finally before presenting our results we wish to scale household 
income/expenditure to take account of differing household size and composition. 
There is an extensive literature on the appropriate choice of equivalence scale.
4 
Here we use a scale which has been widely used in poverty studies in the EU.    
                                                 
4 See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for a discussion.   8
The weights are 1 for the first adult in the household, 0.7 for additional people 
aged over 14 and 0.5 for people aged less than 14. 
 
A final, related, issue is whether the focus should be on income distribution on a 
per person or per household basis.  Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) 
maintain that if no adjustment is made to household income/expenditure for 
household size then it makes sense to accord an equal weight to each household.  
However, should an adjustment along the lines of the equivalence scale described 
above, be made to income/expenditure then person weights are more appropriate.  
Thus each household is weighted by the number of persons therein. 
 
These adjustments lead to revised estimates of the change in expenditure and 
disposable income over the periods in question as the table below shows when we 
compare it to table 1.  The actual values are not of any great interest since they are 
sensitive to the equivalence scale employed, but the percentage changes are 
greater in all cases, reflecting the fact that household size has declined over the 
period. 
 
Table 2: Average Equivalised Expenditure and Income, 1987-1999 
  Total exp.  Disposable Inc.  No. of Observations 





% change  20.7 17.2   





% change  40.8 43.3   






We now present the first of our inequality measures, the Lorenz curve.  Strictly 
speaking the Lorenz curve is a not a measure but a graphical device which can be 
obtained by ordering all income (expenditure) units, starting with the lowest, and 
plotting, against the cumulative proportion of the population so ordered (running   9
from zero to one along the horizontal axis) the cumulative proportion of income 
received by these units.
5  If everybody received the same income then the “curve” 
would be a straight line from (0,0) to (1,1) i.e. a perfect diagonal.  If there is any 
inequality in the distribution of income than the Lorenz curve will lie below the 
perfect diagonal.  Intuitively the further below the diagonal the curve is, the more 
unequal is the income distribution.  Thus if we wished to represent two income 
distributions by Lorenz curves, and one Lorenz curve lay everywhere below the 
other, then that income distribution is more unequal.  This gives rise to the idea of 
“Lorenz Dominance”.  More formally, suppose we have two distributions,  ) (y F  
and ) (y G , with associated Lorenz curves  ) (p LF  and  ) (p LG  then we say that 
distribution F Lorenz Dominates distribution G if  ] 1 , 0 [ ) ( ) ( ∈ ∀ ≥ p p L p L G F  and 
G F L L ≠ .  Note that Lorenz curves are independent of scale, so that if distribution 
F was simply a scaled up version of distribution G then their Lorenz curves would 
be equal.  However, what if there is no Lorenz dominance i.e. if the Lorenz curves 
cross?  Then it is not possible to unambiguously rank one distribution as more 
unequal that the other.  It will always be possible to find two inequality measures 
giving a different ranking. 
 
Unless there are dramatic changes in inequality, Lorenz dominance can be 
difficult to test visually by mere inspection of Lorenz curves.  In these situations it 
is easier to inspect the difference between the line of equality and the Lorenz 
curve (see Deaton, 1997). Transformed Lorenz curves for the three pairwise 
comparisons (1987-1994, 1994-1999 and 1987-1999) for income and expenditure 
are presented as figures 1 to 6.  Figures 2-4 and figure 6 show clear crossings 
indicating that we cannot make any unambiguous statements regarding 
developments in inequality for these cases.  In the other cases even the 
transformed Lorenz curves are difficult to interpret visually so it is necessary to 
examine the actual values of the ordinates of the curves.
6  These show that for 
figure 1, the Lorenz curve for income between 1987 and 1994, Lorenz dominance 
applies in the sense that the curve for 1994 always lies above that for 1987, though 
                                                 
5 We explain the Lorenz curve and other inequality concepts here in terms of income, but it should be 
understood that the analysis applies to any measure of household resources, including expenditure. 
6 These values are available from the authors on request.   10
the difference could not be described as economically significant in the sense 
outlined by McCloskey and Ziliak (1996). 
 
For figure 5, the Lorenz curve for expenditure between 1994/95 and 1999/2000 
the ordinates show that the Lorenz curve for 1994 lies above that for 1999 right up 
to the 92
nd percentile, after which the Lorenz curve for 1999 lies above.  Thus for 
virtually all but the very upper part of the expenditure distribution, inequality was 
lower in 1994/95 than in 1999/2000. 
 
Given that almost all of the possible pairwise Lorenz comparisons show crossings 
(albeit some at very high levels of expenditure), what are the results for individual 
inequality measures?  The table below shows results for five different inequality 
measures, the Gini coefficient (G) , the coefficient of variation (C), and the 
Atkinson inequality measure with inequality aversion coefficients of 1, 2 and 5 
(A-1, A-2, A-5) with bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. 
Table 3: Inequality Indices, 1987-1999 
  Income Expenditure 
  1987 1994 1999 1987  1994 1999 





























































In discussing these figures it is perhaps best to discuss developments in the G, C and 
A-1 values first, as these are the inequality measures which put least emphasis on 
developments in the lower part of the distribution.  Dealing with the figures for 
income first, they suggest that inequality fell slightly between 1987 and 1994, but 
appeared to rise slightly between 1994 and 1999.  In the case of expenditure, 
inequality is pretty much unchanged between 1987 and 1994 and then rises somewhat 
in 1999. 
   11
Turning now to the A-2 and A-5 measures it is important to remember that 
developments in these measures will be more heavily influenced by what happens at 
the lower end of the distribution.  In that sense they may throw more light on the issue 
of the extent to which growth over the period was “pro-poor”.  For the 1987-1994 
period there is relatively little change in the A-2 index but the A-5 index falls, 
suggesting that developments at the lower end of the income distribution were pro-
equality over this period.  However, both indices, and the A-5 one in particular, show 
fairly substantial increases between 1994 and 1999.  We will investigate this issue in 
more detail below, but it does suggest that the 1994-1999 period saw a relative 
worsening in the position of those at the very lowest part of the income/expenditure 
distribution. 
 
4.  Was Growth in Ireland Pro or Anti Poor? 
 
The results in section 3 suggested that there was little change in inequality over the 
1987-1994 period, but that in the period between 1994 and 1999 there was a relative 
worsening in the position of those at the lowest part of the income distribution.  We 
can  investigate this more formally by examining what Ravallion and Chen (2003) 
term the “growth incidence curve”.  Following their notation let  ) (y Ft  be the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of income (expenditure), giving the 
proportion of the population with income less than y at date t.  Inverting the CDF at 
the pth quantile gives the income of that quantile.  Thus  
t t t t p L p F p y µ ) ( ) ( ) (
1 ′ = =
−  with  0 ) ( > ′ p yt  
where ) (p Lt  is the Lorenz curve with slope  ) (p Lt′  and  t µ  is the mean. 
 
Now, comparing two dates t and t-1, the growth rate in income of the pth quantile is 
1 )] ( / ) ( [ ) ( 1 − = − p y p y p g t t t .  Thus when p varies from zero to one,  ) (p gt traces out 
what Ravallion and Chen (2003) term the “growth incidence curve” (GIC).  From the 
expression for  ) (p yt  above it is clear that  















p g γ    12
where 1 ) / ( 1 − = − t t t µ µ γ  is the growth rate in mean income.  If  ) (p gt  is a decreasing 
function of p for all p, then growth rates for poorer quantiles are greater than for 
richer quantiles and so inequality must be falling between period t and t-1 for all 
inequality measures satisfying the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. 
 
Pro-poor growth can be investigated visually via inspection of the GIC curves, but it 
can also be measured by a summary statistic related to the Watts index of poverty (see 
Watts, 1968 and Zheng, 1993).  For a given poverty line z, the headcount index 
measures the fraction of individuals with income less than or equal to z.  Thus the 
headcount index  ) (z F H t t = .  The Watts index can be expressed in terms of the 
quantile function as 
∫ =
t H
t t dp p y z W
0
)] ( / log[ . 
The change in the Watts index over time can be expressed as  
∫∫ = = −
tt HH
t









If we divide the last expression by the headcount index,  t H , we obtain the measure of 











Note that this measure differs from the growth rate in the mean income of the poor, a 
measure which is frequently quoted.  We now present GIC curves for income and 
expenditure for Ireland for 1987-1999 and also the associated rates of pro-poor 
growth for various percentiles. 
 
Figures 7 and 8 show the GIC curves for the 1987-1999 period for expenditure and 
income respectively.  The curves are extremely useful as it is possible to see precisely 
what parts of the distribution are driving the movements in the various inequality 
indices.   For expenditure, the 1994-1987 curve is pretty flat, suggesting that growth 
was neither particularly pro or anti poor, and confirming the results for the various 
inequality indices in table 2.  For income the 1994-1987 curve has a gradual 
downward slope until about the 40
th percentile.  It then gradually slopes up until about   13
the 70
th percentile before declining again.  All indices show a decrease in inequality 
with the decrease most pronounced for the A-5 index, reflecting the downward slope 
up to the 40
th percentile.   
 
Turning now to the 1999-1994 and 1999-1987 curves and dealing with expenditure 
first, we observe that for 1999-1987, with the exception of a section between about 
the 7
th and 11
th percentile, the graph slopes gradually upwards until about the 70
th 
percentile.  After that it flattens out and then drops after about the 90
th percentile 
(though at percentiles beyond the 90
th there may be some measurement error).  This is 
reflected in the slight increases in the inequality indices.  As is to be expected, the 
index showing the greatest increase is the A-5 index, since developments in this index 
will be very insensitive to the downward sloping part of the GIC curve after the 70
th 
percentile.  For the 1999-1994 curve we see that it slopes up gradually until about the 
45
th percentile, after which it is flat.  Once again, movements in the A-5 index reflect 
what happens in the lower part of the distribution. 
 
Turning now to income, 1999-1987 is quite steeply sloped upward as far as the 12
th 
percentile.  The curve then slopes downward, until about percentile 26, followed by a 
gradual upward sloped section as far as percentile 50.  After this the curve has a very 
gentle downward slope which accelerates slightly after about the 80
th percentile.  This 
pattern is broadly repeated for the 1999-1994 curve.  This complex pattern of slopes is 
reflected in the changes in the various inequality indices, with some showing a rise 
and some showing a fall.  The A-5 index shows the clearest change, reflecting the 
steeply sloped upward section of the GIC curve as far as percentile 12.   14
Table 4: Rates of Pro-Poor Growth for Equivalised Expenditure 
 1987-94  1994-99  1987-99 
  Growth rate in Mean Expenditure 
  20.7 40.8 70.0 
p=  Growth Rate for Poorest p% 
10  21.0 28.8 55.9 
15  20.2 30.2 56.5 
20  20.1 31.4 57.7 
25  19.9 32.6 59.0 
50  19.7 36.9 63.8 
100  20.7 39.5 68.4 
 
Table 5: Rates of Pro-Poor Growth for Equivalised Income 
 1987-94  1994-99  1987-99 
  Growth rate in Mean Income 
  17.2 43.3 68.1 
p=  Growth Rate for Poorest p% 
10  22.55 25.70 54.06 
15  22.05 30.16 58.82 
20  21.58 32.46 60.99 
25  21.03 33.68 61.72 
50  18.55 39.64 65.34 
100  17.87 42.52 67.88 
 
 
The rates of pro-poor growth reflect developments in the GIC curves.   
 
In summarising the results from section 4 it seems to fair to say that growth over the 
1987 to 1994 period was mildly pro-poor.  Since 1994, growth has been relatively less 
favourable to the poor, mainly on account of developments in the lowest decile.  For 
the other deciles, growth has been more or less neutral.  In terms of changes in overall 
inequality indices, there is evidence of a slight increase in inequality of expenditure 
but inequality of disposable income is pretty much unchanged.  However, it is   15
possible that even though inequality of disposable income is unchanged, the same 
might not be true of the components of disposable income.  That is the subject matter 
of section 5. 
 
 
5.  Sources of Income Inequality Over Time 
 
In this section we show how the Gini coefficient for overall income may be decomposed 
by sources of income.
7  Before doing so, we briefly discuss general issues concerning 
the decomposition of inequality.  Shorrocks (1982) discusses in general how inequality 
may be decomposed by factor components.  He shows that the contribution of any factor 
expressed as a proportion of total inequality can be made to give any value between plus 
and minus infinity.  This rather negative result arises from the fact that the particular 
functional representation used for any inequality index is not uniquely determined.  In 
this paper a decomposition with reasonable intuitive appeal is used whereby each 
component's contribution to inequality is the product of its own inequality, its share of 
total income and its correlation with the rank of total income. 
  We start off by noting that the Gini coefficient, G, can be expressed in terms of 
the area under the Lorenz curve, where as explained above the Lorenz curve relates the 
cumulative proportion of income units to the cumulative proportion of income received 
when units are arranged in ascending order of their income.  A value of G=1 represents 
maximum inequality while G=0 represents zero inequality.  More specifically, we have 
where G is the Gini coefficient, and L(p) is the Lorenz curve ( we suppress the time 
subscript for convenience).  If we integrate this expression by parts we obtain 
Suppose now we transform the variables with the substitution of p=F(y) where F(y) is 
the cumulative distribution of income.  This gives us 
                                                 
    
7  The following discussion draws on Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). 
  G =  1 - 2  L(p) dp
1
0 ∫   
  G =  2  p L (p) dp - 1
1
0 ∫ ′     16
where f(y) is the frequency distribution of income and  y µ  is mean income.  From the 
formula for covariance between two random variables X and Z we have 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( Z E X E XZ E Z X Cov − = .  Letting X be income, y, and Z be F(y), the 







2 / 1 ) ( ) ( )] ( [ pdp dy y f y F y F E  and  y y E µ = ) ( .  Combining we obtain 
i.e. the Gini coefficient can be expressed in terms of the covariance between incomes 
and their ranks. 








we can write 
where  cov[yk, F(y)] is the covariance of income component k with the cumulative 
distribution of income.  Multiplying and dividing each component k by cov[yk, F(yk)], 
i.e. the covariance between income component  k y  and the cumulative distribution of 






k k k S G R G
1
 where Rk is the "Gini correlation" between income component k 
and total income, Gk is the relative Gini of component k, and Sk is component k's share 
  G =  -1 + 2  


















  G =  2 







  G=  
cov[ y , F(y)]
cov[ y , F(y )]
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of total income.  As discussed in Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) the Gini correlation 
has the following properties: 
 (a)  1 1 ≤ ≤ − k R .  If yk and y are independent, then Rk equals zero.  If yk is a 
monotonically increasing function of y, then Rk is 1, while if it is a monotonically 
decreasing function, then Rk is -1 (this property is similar to Spearman's rank correlation, 
since it tells us that if households' rank according to yk is exactly the same as their rank 
according to y, then Rk=1.) 
 (b)  If  yk and y are normally distributed, then ρ = k R , Pearson's correlation 
coefficient. 
  Using the above decomposition of inequality by source, we can examine how 
changes in particular income sources will affect overall inequality.  Suppose we have an 
exogenous change in each household's income component j by a factor of e, such that 
yj(e)=(1+e)yj.  Then
8 
Dividing by G we also obtain 
Thus the relative effect of a marginal percentage change in component j upon inequality 
equals the relative contribution of component j to overall inequality minus the relative 
contribution to total income.  Thus if the Gini correlation between component j and total 
income, Rj, is negative or zero, an increase in component j will decrease inequality.  If Rj 
is positive, then the impact upon inequality depends upon the sign of RjGj-G.  A 
necessary condition for inequality to increase is that the inequality of component j must 
exceed the inequality of total income i.e. Gj>G  since  1 ≤ j R . 
 
It is also possible to decompose changes in the Gini coefficient over time.  Along the 
lines of the decomposition outlined above, the change in inequality between year 1 and 
year 0 is decomposed by income source and the three factors introduced above: income 
shares  k S , the “Gini correlation”  k R , and the Gini coefficient for each source of income, 
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Thus the total change in inequality is decomposed along two dimensions: the 
contribution of each income source due to changes in k S ,  k R  and  k G , and the 
contribution of changes in  k S ,  k R  and  k G  across the different components of income.   
In table 7 below we present the decomposition of the Gini for 1987, 1994 and 1999 
respectively.  Disposable income is decomposed into five parts: earned income of head 
of household, other earned income, other income, transfers and taxes.  Table 6 first of all 
gives the values of  k S ,  k G  and  k R  for each of the components. 
 
Table 6: Gini Coefficients, Gini Correlations and Shares of Income for Disposable 
Income Components, 1987-1999 
  1987 1994  1999 
 
k S   k G   k R   k S   k G   k R   k S   k G   k R  
Earned income, hoh  0.66 0.58 0.69 0.61 0.59  0.7 0.58  0.56  0.68
Other earned income  0.25 0.8 0.69 0.24 0.78 0.64 0.35  0.66  0.65
Other income  0.09 0.85 0.48 0.12 0.84  0.51 0.11  0.82  0.42
Transfers  0.22 0.57 -0.33 0.22 0.57 -0.38 0.15  0.60  -0.39
Taxes  -0.23 0.66 0.78 -0.19 0.65  0.76 -0.19  0.62  0.79
 
Amongst the more notable feature of this table is the relative decline in the 
importance of earned income of the head of household.  This is offset by a fall in 
direct taxes (especially between 1987 and 1994, reflecting the changes in tax rates 
over that period) and also by a marked rise in earned income from other members of 
the household.  This latter development reflects the increase in households with more 
than one earner following the increase in employment during the Celtic Tiger years (it   19
is also noticeable that the Gini coefficient for this item falls as opportunities for 
employment increase).  Transfers diminish in relative importance as unemployment 
falls. 
 
Table 7: Gini Decomposition by Source of Income, 1987-1999 



















e G ∂ ∂ /
Earned income, hoh  0.27 0.08  0.29  0.25 0.08  0.29  0.22 0.06  0.22 
Other earned income  0.14 0.07  0.24  0.12 0.05  0.18  0.15 0.05  0.19 
Other income  0.03 0.01  0.04  0.05 0.02  0.06  0.04 0.01  0.03 
Transfers  -0.04  -0.1  -0.37  -0.05 -0.11  -0.39  -0.04 -0.08  -0.28 
Taxes  -0.12 -0.05  -0.19  -0.09 -0.04  -0.15  -0.09 -0.04  -0.14 
Disp. Income  0.28 0  0  0.28 0  0 0.28  0  0 
 
As table 7 shows, the overall Gini coefficient for disposable income changes very 
little over the period.  However, the relative contribution of each component does not 
remain unchanged.  The average and marginal contribution of earned income of 
household head to the Gini falls.  This presumably reflects the fact that as 
employment opportunities expanded, more individuals in households who had 
previously been at the lower end of the income distribution found jobs and their 
earned income contributed to a fall in inequality.  The same is likely to be true for 
other earned income.  The contribution of taxes and transfers in reducing inequality 
has also fallen.  This is once again explicable in terms of employment.  As table 6 
shows, transfer income becomes less important in terms of its share of disposable 
income.  It also becomes more concentrated amongst the lower part of the income 
distribution (witness the change in  k R  for transfers).  The combination of these two 
factors lead to a reduction in its role in terms of lowering inequality at the margin.  
Taxes also fall as a percentage of disposable income reflecting changes in tax rates 
and also presumably a greater percentage of taxpayers paying taxes at the standard 
rather than the higher rate.
9 
 
                                                 
9 We carried out a similar decomposition for Donaldson and Weymark’s “generalised  Gini” 
(Donaldson and Weymark, 1980, 1983) , which resembles Atkinson’s index in that the degree of 
inequality aversion can be changed with differing weight on different parts of the distribution.  The 
results (which are available on request) are qualitatively very similar to those in table 7.   20
We now turn to changes over time.  We will reserve the discussion to the changes 
over the period as a whole i.e 1987-1999.  Looking first of all at changes in  k S ,  k G  
and  k R , it is interesting to note that while the overall Gini has remained essentially 
unchanged, this has been due to offsetting factors.
10  Thus changes in   k S  on their own 
would have led to an increase in the Gini of 0.51.  This is primarily because of the 
reduced share of earned income of the head of the household (which had a relatively low 
Gini) to earned income of others in the household (which has a relatively high Gini).  
Changes in the share of disposable income accounted for by taxes and transfers also 
contributed to a rise of about 0.034 in the Gini.  However, changes in  k G  and  k R  led to 
reductions in the Gini of 0.034 and 0.025 respectively.  The principal contributor to the 
change in  k G  was the reduced Gini for earned income of other household earners, which 
accounted for over 90% (.031/.034) of the total fall in  k G . 
 
Turning now to the decomposition along the dimension of sources of income (we are 
now looking at the column marked “total”) we see that for 1987 to 1999 the overall 
change in the Gini was tiny, but that this once again masked offsetting factors.  Changes 
arising from earned income of the head of household contributed to a lowering of 0.043 
in the Gini, but this was offset by increases in other factors, primarily changes in direct 
taxation. 
 
It seems fair to say in summary that overall inequality of disposable income is 
essentially unchanged over the 1987 to 1999 period.  Despite that there is some 
“churning” in terms of the components of inequality.  The drop in the share of earned 
income of the household head in disposable income exerts downward pressure on 
inequality – on its own this would lead to a fall in the Gini of 0.034 ( a fall of over 
10%).  But this is offset by a combination of other factors, principally the change in 
the shares of earned income of others, taxes and transfers.  Changes in the Ginis of 
individual components of income and in the Gini correlations of the different 
components of disposable income generally exert downward pressure on inequality. 
                                                 
10 Thus here we are looking at the row marked total for each period.   21
Table 8: Change in Gini Decomposition by Source of Income, 1987-1999 
1987-1994  k G   k R   k S   Total 
Earned y, hoh  0.005 0.001  -0.022  -0.016 
Earned y, others  -0.003 -0.01 -0.006  -0.019 
Other y  -0.001 0.003 0.012 0.014 
Transfers  0 -0.007  0.001  -0.006 
Taxes  0.001 0.002 0.02  0.023 
Total 0.002  -0.011  0.005  -0.004 
Residual       -0.001 
Change in G       -0.005 
        
        
        
1987-1999  k G   k R   k S   Total 
Earned y, hoh  -0.006 -0.003 -0.034 -0.043 
Earned y, others  -0.031 -0.01 0.042 0.001 
Other y  -0.001 -0.005 0.009  0.003 
Transfers  -0.002 -0.006 0.017  0.009 
Taxes  0.006 -0.001 0.017 0.022 
Total -0.034  -0.025  0.051  -0.008 
Residual       0.007 
Change in G       -0.001 
        
        
        
1994-1999  k G   k R   k S   Total 
Earned y, hoh  -0.01 -0.004  -0.013  -0.027 
Earned y, others  -0.026 0.002 0.047 0.023 
Other y  -0.001 -0.008 -0.001  -0.01 
Transfers  -0.002 -0.001 0.017  0.014 
Taxes  0.005 -0.003  -0.003 -0.001 
Total -0.034  -0.014  0.047  -0.001 
Residual       0.005 
Change in G       0.004 
 
 
6.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the changes in inequality in Ireland over the 1987/88 to 
1999/2000 period using both income and expenditure data from the Irish Household 
Budget Survey.  In particular we have investigated the extent to which the rapid 
growth observed over the period was “pro-poor”.  We find that on average growth 
was not particularly pro or anti poor but that different parts of the income and (to a 
lesser extent) expenditure distribution had different experiences.  In relative terms, 
between 1994 and 1999, those at the very lowest part of the income distribution (the   22
lowest 14%) fared less well than others.  Those from about the 50
th to the 70
th 
percentile did best, but those at the very top fared no better than average.  The overall 
gradient for expenditure was less pronounced with a gradual upward slope, arising 
from developments between 1994 and 1999. 
 
One implication of these figures is that for the lowest decile, particularly over the 
1994-1999 period, the growth in expenditure exceeded that in income, suggesting 
some form of dissaving going on, though the possibility of measurement error cannot 
be ruled out here, despite the trimming of the data. 
 
While overall inequality indices for disposable income show little change over the 
period, it is still possible that individual components might show some movement.  
The decomposition of the Gini coefficient for disposable income in section 5 
investigates this issue.  The results show that the degree of change for individual 
components of disposable income was relatively limited.  A fall in the share of 
disposable income arising from the earned income of the head of the household 
exerted downward pressure on inequality but this was offset by a host of other factors 
including changes in the Ginis and the Gini correlations of individual components of 
income.   23
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